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Abstract
First, the progressive development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (“CFSP”) and
European Security and Defense Policy (“ESDP”) in the successive Treaty amendments will be
sketched in its character as heritage of the French Fouchet Plan of 1961-62. Second, the idea of a
dialogue between the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) and the Member States as constitutional
law-givers will be sketched in greater detail. This presumably will enable us to recognize some
kind of continuity in these developments and the final question to be answered will be whether
this continuity is also apparent in the considerably amended provisions on external relations of the
Reform Treaty.
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INTRODUCTION
Anyone studying the evolution of the external relations
powers of the European Community ("EC" or the "Community")
and later the European Union ("EU" or the "Union") will be
struck by the considerable role played by a series ofjudgments of
the European Court ofJustice ("ECJ"). These judgments, begin-
ning in the 1970s have been rendered in two domains: (1) the
general external relations power of the Community/Union and
in particular its exclusive character, and (2) the common com-
mercial policy of the Community and in particular its scope.
The continuity with which the ECJ returns to these issues and in
doing so further refines and adjusts its case law is remarkable. In
the area of the general foreign relations power, the series of
cases stretches from the early 1970s, Commission of the European
Communities v. Council of the European Communities,' establishing
an implied powers approach in the external relations domain,
until the recent Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano Convention.2
With respect to the scope of trade policy the evolution starts in
the mid-to-late 197 0s with Opinions 1/753 and 1/78,4 laying
down the exclusive and broad character of trade policy powers,
* Professor, University of Amsterdam.
1. Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263 [hereinafter ERTA].
2. Competency of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, Opinion 1/03, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
3. Opinion of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") Given Pursuant to Article 228
of the E.E.C. Treaty, Opinion 1/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1355.
4. International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R.
2871.
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and has now reached Commission of the European Communities v.
Council of the European Union5 on the interpretation of the Nice
version of Article 133 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community ("EC Treaty") on trade policy (still pending).
This last reference to the Treaty of Nice serves to remind us
that the ECJ is not developing the external relations powers of
the Community/Union in splendid isolation. The Member
States as treaty makers, as constitutional legislators, are also in
this game. They react to the interpretations of the ECJ and the
ECJ has to take into account and interpret the texts that they
produce in their role of "masters of the Treaty." In short, since
the treaty reforms started back in 1986 with the Single European
Act ("Single Act"), there is a kind of dialogue between the ECJ
and the Member States acting as "constituante" on the powers of
the Community in the field of foreign relations. The limitation
to the Community is conscious here, because it is only in the
Community domain that the voice of the ECJ, also on external
relations and trade policy, is heard. Next to that, there is the
secular trend that started with the codification of the European
Political Cooperation ("EPC") in the Single Act, followed by the
second pillar in the Maastricht Treaty and culminating, for the
moment, in a Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP").
According to the Treaty of Lisbon ("Reform Treaty"), CFSP is an
integral part of one single Union external policy, but neverthe-
less governed by special procedures and kept carefully isolated
from the Community "acquis" by a double barrier, one that is
supposed to keep the "intergovernmental" CFSP out of other
(formerly Community) policies of the Union and to protect the
CFSP from the (supposedly) nefarious influence of "suprana-
tional" decision-making.
This Essay seeks to develop these two trends in greater de-
tail. First, the progressive development of the CFSP and Euro-
pean Security and Defense Policy ("ESDP") 6 in the successive
Treaty amendments will be sketched in its character as heritage
of the French Fouchet Plan of 1961-62. Second, the idea of a
dialogue between the ECJ and the Member States as constitu-
tional law-givers will be sketched in greater detail. This presuma-
5. Commission v. Council, Case C 13/07 (pending case).
6. The European Security and Defense Policy ("ESDP") is a major element of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy ("CSFP") pillar of the European Union ("EU").
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bly will enable us to recognize some kind of continuity in these
developments and the final question to be answered will be
whether this continuity is also apparent in the considerably
amended provisions on external relations of the Reform Treaty.
I. THE FOUCHET PLAN AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY ("CESP")
The first trend in the development of the external relations
of the European communities is part of the broader trend, ini-
tially primarily supported by the France of De Gaulle, but later
also by other Member States, to control the so-called suprana-
tional communities by superimposing on them an intergovern-
mental structure,7 consisting of a Council of Heads of States and
Governments, that would basically provide for the broad politi-
cal impulsions of European cooperation.8 The right of initiative
in the communities was too important to be left (entirely) to the
European Commission (the "Commission") that might too easily
escape the Member States' grip from time to time. This inter-
governmental approach should in particular be guaranteed in
the field of foreign relations and defense. If it was sometimes
said in jest, that the process of European integration consisted of
the ministers of foreign affairs giving away the powers of their
colleagues in the national governments, the Fouchet plan made
clear that the ministers of foreign affairs were going to stop
where their own powers were at stake.
It is remarkable to what extent especially the second French
version of the Fouchet plan contains in embryonic form many of
the following characteristics that later return in the second pillar
(and also in the Communities themselves): the European Coun-
cil, the multiplicity of Councils of Ministers, and the Political
Commission or Committee. This is not to say that the version
that was opposed to it by the other five Member States differed
that much from Fouchet's ideas. In it, one recognizes elements
that later returned in either the Single Act, such as cooperation
7. But see Article 1 of the Reform Treaty, according to which the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union ("TEU") and the future Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU") are of the same value, an assurance that was missing in earlier drafts. Draft
Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 305/01, arts. 1, 2(b) (2007), opened for signa-
ture Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Reform Treaty].
8. In De Gaulle's vision, no doubt, the existing Communities might better be re-
placed entirely by this "Europe des patries."
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in the field of science and technology, or in the third pillar in
the Maastricht Treaty, such as harmonization and unification in
the field of civil law.9
Europe had to wait nearly twenty-five years to see some of
these ideas return in the Single Act of 1986, which of course
opened with an Article that established the European Council
(the "Council") and ended with a title that codified the EPC,
which had hitherto existed at a purely informal level."0 In the
terms of Article 1 of the Single Act, the European communities
and the EPC shall "contribute together to making concrete pro-
gress towards European unity."" In line with this it also con-
tained a provision that seeks to ensure the consistency between
"the external policies of the European Community and the poli-
cies agreed in European Political Co-operation"' 2 (note that the
external policies of the Community are still mentioned first)-a
provision that was to come back in a different form later on.
The Single Act also heralded the beginning of what was then
called the Political Committee and established "a secretariat
based in Brussels," the embryonic beginning of the now massive
CFSP side of the Council Secretariat.13 However, the contents of
the title on EPC of the Single Act were kept out of the Commu-
nity treaties as such. 4
This changed in Maastricht 5 where, after an overly "supra-
national" draft of the Dutch Presidency had been discarded, the
first steps were set towards the fateful mix of the intergovern-
mental and Community approaches in two closely linked trea-
ties, serviced by the same Institutions, but separated by the "Chi-
nese wall" of Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union
("TEU"). This mix affected in particular the sector of external
relations because Maastricht meant a further development of the
9. The different versions of the Fouchet Plan can be found on the website of Euro-
pean Navigator, http://www.ena.lu/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
10. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]).
11. See SEA, supra note 10, art. 1, O.J. L 169/1, at 4.
12. See id. art. 30(5), O.J. L 169/1, at 13.
13. See id. art. 30 (10)(g), O.J. L 169/1, at 14.
14. See id. art. 30, O.J. L 169/1, at 13-14.
15. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ. C 321 E/i
(1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. The changes in the Maastricht Treaty have
been incorporated into the most recent consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty") and the TEU.
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following provisions on EPC into the CFSP, though still with
some hesitation: no (international) personality for the Union,
no treaty-making power yet under the CFSP, and no High Repre-
sentative for the CFSP. However, the second pillar was by now
equipped with the possibility of taking legal acts and the embry-
onic institutions announced in the Single Act were now inte-
grated into the Community Institutions which became Institu-
tions of the Union. Both the Political Committee and the EPC
Secretariat are now part of the Council machinery. The Com-
mission was merely "associated" with the CFSP.
The "Chinese wall" provision (current Article 47 of the
TEU) is drafted in such a way as to first protect the "Community"
method against the intergovernmental method, but it is interest-
ing to note that the consistency provision has already changed
from the Single Act and is now drafted in neutral terms. The
provision no longer states that Community external policies and
Union policies, including those of the CFSP, have to be consis-
tent with the Community policies mentioned first, but that the
Union shall ensure the consistency of its external activities as a
whole. 6
It is well to recall that the Single Act was negotiated and
adopted and entered into force during the time when the
changes in what soon turned out to be the former Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe became palpable. The time when the con-
sequences of these changes worked themselves out and became
fully clear, most notably the unification of Germany and the vio-
lent disintegration of former Yugoslavia, was precisely the time
when the Treaty of Maastricht was prepared, agreed, and rati-
fied. On the trade side, this was also the time when the long
drawn-out negotiations of the Uruguay Round were going on.
It is only after the Treaty of Amsterdam,1 7 that the CFSP
really took off. That is mainly because Amsterdam gave the
CFSP a head, namely the High Representative/Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Council-a post that was immediately filled by Xavier
Solana, the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization ("NATO") .18 In addition, the Council was given
16. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, art. C, 1 2, O.J. C 321 E/l, at 11 (1992).
17. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, O.J. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
18. See Common Foreign & Security Policy-Overview-Other Institutional Roles in
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treaty-making power under the second pillar, though the text
did not make it clear whether any treaties so concluded would
bind the collectivity of Member States or the Union (which still
did not get international personality at Amsterdam). In spite of
this ambiguity, the Council was not deterred from soon conclud-
ing a considerable number of international agreements, espe-
cially in the field of CFSP, in an effort to gain a certain interna-
tional recognition of the personality of the EU. Amsterdam also
considerably developed the military side of the CFSP through a
provision that seemed to be drafted to permit the Union to work
with or through the Western European Union ("WEU"), but in
reality turned out to be the clarion call for the de facto integra-
tion of the WEU Secretariat into the Council Secretariat through
the personal union of the two Secretaries-general in Mr. So-
lana. 9 One of the most visible results of the entry into force of
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 was the sudden appearance of
a large number of military uniforms of the most staggering vari-
ety in the Council building.
These realities were also reflected in the Treaty of Nice,20 as
the Political Committee was renamed the Political and Security
Committee and was specifically charged with crisis manage-
ment." This was an area, where the Community was already ac-
tive, as there were instruments relating to civilian crisis manage-
ment in the area of man-made and natural disasters inside the
Community and also in third countries.2 2 In addition, it was now
clarified that the international agreements concluded by the
Council in the framework of the second and third pillar were
supposed to be agreements of the Union.
The period of the Amsterdam and Nice treaties was one of
increasing legal activity in the field of the CFSP and the creation
the CFSP process, http://ec.europa.eu/external-relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2008).
19. See generally PETER CROSS & OTFRIED NASSAUER, BRITISH AMERICAN SECURITV IN-
FORMATION COUNCIL [BASIC], EUROPEAN SECURITY: SHARKS AND MINNOWS OFF HELSINKI
(2001), http://www.basicint.org/europe/confprev/ES-SharksMinnows-1999dec.htm.
20. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
OJ. C 325/33 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Consolidated EC Treaty], as amended by the
Treaty of Nice, Mar. 10, 2001, OJ. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice].
21. See Treaty of Nice, supra note 20, art. 1(5), OJ. C 80/1, at 8. Article I of the
Treaty of Nice is now the current Article 25 of the TEU.
22. See generally Council Decision No. 2007/779/ EC, OJ. L 314/9 (2007).
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of a large number of police and military operations.23 It also
became a habit of the Council to use the "consistency clause"
ever so gently in a way that pushed the Community into action in
the service of the CFSP. To this end, a formula was developed
which was based on the consistency clause of Article 3 and which
carefully avoided breaking through the "Chinese wall" clause of
Article 47. This formula reminded the Community that the
Council intended to do what was necessary under the EC Treaty
in line with the CFSP action undertaken. 24 These were the signs
of a gentle subordination of the Community to the Union that
was beginning to take shape. There were also moments, how-
ever, where the Council was less subtle and seemed bent on pre-
empting Community action by going ahead with Union action.
This overt Council movement can be seen in the case of the
EUJUST action in Georgia 21 or the action with respect to Small
Arms and Light Weapons ("SALW") in West-Africa. The SALW
action even provoked the Commission into a case against the
Council, arguing that it had crossed the frontier with Commu-
nity powers in the field of development, thus breaching Article
47 of the TEU.2 6
Summarizing the crucial points of this brief historical sketch
of the successive stages of development of the CFSP, the major
point that can be made here is that the intergovernmental
Union comes ever closer to the Community. There are areas,
such as Schengen and the third pillar which make the full transi-
tion to the Community method, but in external relations that
transition, unsurprisingly, is not made. There the CFSP, remain-
ing clearly intergovernmental, comes ever closer to being a lead-
ing influence on Community external relations. That is exactly
as many Member States want it, since in their view-a view that
23. See Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order, 43 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 337, 337-94 (2006).
24. The standard formula reads as follows: "[tihe Council notes the intention of
the Commission to direct its action towards achieving the objectives of thisJoint Action,
where appropriate, by relevant Community instruments." Council Joint Action No.
2004/523/CFSP, art. 11(1), OJ. L 228/21, at 23 (2004).
25. See id. arts. 1-14, O.J. L 228/21, at 21-24 (2004).
26. See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Commission v. Council, Case C-
91/05, 23 (ECJ Sept. 19, 2007) (not yet reported), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005C0091:EN:HTML. The Advocate-
General went along with the Commission on many points of principle, but in the end
advised the ECJ that the Council had properly taken the action under the CFSP and not
under the development cooperation provisions of the Treaty. See id. it 213-21.
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some have held ever since the Fouchet plan-they need a firm
grip on anything that is foreign policy.
II. THE 'DIALOGUE" BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE ("ECJ") AND THE MEMBER STATES AS
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATORS
A. The ECJ's first judgment in the external relations field
It was the ECJ that opened this dialogue with its path-break-
ing judgments in the field of general external relations powers
and the common commercial policy. The first domain in Com-
mission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Com-
munities ("ERTA") and Opinion 1/76 established the principle
that, in spite of the scanty references to substantive external pow-
ers in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity ("EEC Treaty"), the Community had such powers in all ar-
eas covered by the EC Treaty.2 7 This potential power could be-
come exclusive to the Community if any internal legislation that
had been enacted was affected or its scope altered by an interna-
tional agreement pertaining to that legislation was to be con-
cluded by a Member State or collectively by all the Member
States. 28 Such exclusivity could also arise if the conclusion of the
agreement in question was necessary to reach an objective of the
Community.29 Obviously these cases were in need of further ex-
planation and precision which would take many years and many
new cases. Yet, their power is best illustrated by the fact that the
ERTA case was capable of slowing down internal legislation,
since Member States in the Council repeatedly expressed anxiety
about losing external powers once they would have decided on
internal legislation in the Council.
In the field of commercial policy the 1970s were character-
ized by the two blockbuster opinions, Opinion 1/75 and Opin-
ion 1/78, which laid down the exclusive and evolving character
of the Community power with respect to the common commer-
cial policy. ° These opinions also demonstrated the broad and
27. See ERTA, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 14; Draft Agreement Establishing a
European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, Opinion 1/76, [1997] E.C.R.
741, 1 4.
28. See ERTA, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263, 17.
29. See Opinion 1/76, [1997] E.C.R. 741, 1 4.
30. See Opinion of the ECJ Given Pursuant to Article 228 of the E.E.C. Treaty,
Opinion 1/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1355, 2.
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evolving character of this power, by encompassing all trade in-
struments in other areas of external relations, such as develop-
ment. This broad power made it impossible for Member States,
or so it seemed at the time, to escape the strictures of the Com-
munity commercial policy by using new or different instruments
in this area.3"
If one adds to this mix of different cases, the International
Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit3 2 (which
posited the principle that in all the areas where the Member
States had transferred exclusive external powers to the Commu-
nity, the Community was destined to replace the Member States
in the international organizations working in that field, in this
case the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), it is clear
that this made for a heady mix for those working inside the
Community external relations machinery and a rather scary one
for those in the Member States' foreign policy bureaucracies.
Since it was now conceivable that by dint of the operation of the
ERTA doctrine or by direct resort to exclusive external compe-
tence pursuant to Opinion 1/76, different areas of external rela-
tions powers would successively acquire an exclusive character.
That being the case, Member States would then be inexorably
driven from one international organization after another, thus
losing a vital manifestation of their continuing external sover-
eignty. Obviously the threat was not immediate, since the Com-
munity, in particular the Commission, in the 1970s and 1980s
lacked the manpower and the expertise to assume such a "suc-
cession" to its Member States in many international organiza-
tions, but the perspective as such was worrying enough for many.
Moreover, Member States, in practice, found a way of re-
straining the logic outlined above by obliging the Community to
conclude so-called "mixed agreements." Sometimes there was a
31. See International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R.
2871, 4546.
32. See Int'l Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en FruitJoined Cases 21-
24/72, [1972] E.C.R. 1219, 1 16-18. These cases applied the so-called "succession doc-
trine" initially to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade only. For its possible
extension to, for instance, the area of United Nations ("UN") sanctions against South-
ern-Rhodesia in the early 1970s, see P.J. Kuijper, Sanctions Against Rhodesia: The EEC and
the Implementation of General International Legal Rules, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 231, 238
(1975). The application of the "succession doctrine" to the realm of UN sanctions was
recently revivified by the Court of First Instance. See Kadi v. Council, Case T-315/01,
194-204 (CFI Sept. 21, 2005) (not yet reported).
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justification for this, when there were indeed subjects outside ex-
clusive Community competence, included in the agreements. In
others there was not, such as the conclusion of mixed association
agreements, which became the norm in spite of the fact that it
was clear that this was unnecessary as the Association Agree-
ments with Cyprus and Malta were concluded as exclusive Com-
munity agreements. The late 1970s and early 1980s were when
this phenomenon really took off.3
B. The Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht
One might say that in response to this case law, the Single
Act and the Maastricht Treaty not only followed the old lead of
the Fouchet Plan by developing the EPC into the CFSP, but also
created specific powers in the field of external relations, which
were explicitly declared to be shared powers right from the start.
This was the case for the external aspects of the areas of re-
search, technology,34 and the environment 5 in the Single Act.
Later, in the Maastricht Treaty, development policy 6 was added.
In that case it was explicitly stated that Member States could con-
tinue to act on the international level and conclude agreements
with respect to development cooperation, as long as that was not
in contradiction with Community policy and Community agree-
ments. 7 This exceptional permission, contrary to the ECJ's
ERTA doctrine, could be considered acceptable, since develop-
ment policies and agreements-especially as long as they con-
centrate on core development policy instruments, such as tech-
nical and financial assistance-can be easily complementary and
would probably increase the total amount of development assis-
tance.
However, it was not the intended goal in the Maastricht
Treaty to do away outright with the ERTA doctrine. A declara-
tion accompanying the Maastricht Treaty stated that the articles
which laid down external relations in the field of the environ-
ment, research and technology, and in external monetary policy
33. The first major conference and book on mixity dates from 1982. See generally
MIXED AGPEEMENTS (David O'Keeffe and Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983).
34. See SEA, supra note 10, art. 130f, O.J. L 169/1, at 10.
35. See id. art. 130r(5), O.J. L 169/1, at 12.
36. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, art. 130y, O.J. C 321 E/1 (1992). Article
130y of the Maastricht Treaty is now current Article 181 of TEU.
37. See Council Decision No. 69/494/EEC, O.J. L 326/39, 39-42 (1969).
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were shared competence and thus did not stand in the way of
the ERTA doctrine applying in these areas. On the other hand,
the Maastricht Treaty, with respect to the treaty-making power in
the field of external monetary policy, laid down that the normal
procedural rules did not apply and that it was up to the Council
to decide who would be the negotiator of such agreements." In
other words, the traditional role of the Commission as the exter-
nal "face" of, and negotiator for, the Community was clearly be-
ing undermined in this new important area of Community com-
petence without any clear justification.
These new, explicit, and shared external relations powers
introduced in the Maastricht Treaty clearly responded to the ex-
ternal and internal needs of the Community. They were part
and parcel of new internal powers, with the exception of devel-
opment policy. Monetary policy apart, they had been exercised
partially on the basis of internal market provisions, including
harmonization, and partially on the basis of the "flexibility" pro-
vision (current Article 308 of the EC Treaty).3 9 Apart from the
internal need for these powers, there also was a clear external
reason: science, technology, environment and development
were, in the early 1990s, on the threshold of a treaty-making ex-
plosion that was strongly fed in environment and development
by the notion of sustainable development. Nevertheless, their
codification as shared competences served to rob these areas of
the kind of dynamism in the development of external relations
powers that had existed in the 1970s and 1980s on the basis of
the ERTA doctrine and the case law on common commercial
policy. In spite of the Maastricht declaration on ERTA, it be-
came much easier for the Member States in the Council to insist
on a mixed character of international agreements in these fields,
and it required much persistence from the Commission and a
constant willingness to go to the ECJ to invoke that declaration
and to insist on exclusive competence. In the daily reality of ex-
ternal relations, where time is short and questions of compe-
tence have to be decided quickly, these were qualities that were
difficult to muster.4 °
38. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, art. 109, O.J. C 321 E/I (1992). Article
109 of the Maastricht Treaty is current Article 111 of the TEU.
39. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 308, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 179 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
40. See, e.g., Convention Number 170 of the International Labour Organization
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Finally, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the first explicit
"bridge" between the CFSP and the trade policy powers of the
Community in the form of Article 228a (current Article 301 of
the EC Treaty) of the Maastricht Treaty.4 Basing itself on ear-
lier informal practice, trade sanctions decided by the Security
Council, or even decided autonomously, were implemented on
the basis of the trade policy powers of the Community, only after
consultation between the Member States under the (near-obso-
lete) Article 224 (current Article 297) of the EC Treaty or within
the framework of the EPC.42 The inter-governmental confer-
ence fashioned this new provision that-notwithstanding the
separation between the pillars imposed by Article 47 of the
TEU-demanded that the community follow the lead of the
Union (CFSP) in matters of trade sanctions.
C. The ECJ steps on the brakes
In the light of these developments at the intergovernmental
level, it is striking how much more cautious, not to say restrictive
the ECJ became directly after the conclusion of the Single Act
and during the negotiation and ratification procedure of the
Treaty of Maastricht, both in respect of general external rela-
tions powers and of trade policy powers.
In Opinion 2/91, which concerned the power of the Com-
munity to become a party to an International Labor Organiza-
tion ("ILO")4 4 Convention concerning safety in the use of chem-
icals at work (Convention No. 170), 45 the ECJ applied a starkly
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-
1061.
41. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, art. 228a, O.J. C 321/01. Article 228a of
the Maastricht Treaty is current Article 301 of the EC Treaty.
42. See P.J. Kuijper, European Economic Community, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF Ex-
PORT CONTROL, JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES, 57, 57-77 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1992).
43. It is striking how much weight is attached to this sanctioned subservience of
the Community to the Union both by the Court of First Instance. See Kadi v. Council,
Case T-315/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 122-35; Opinion of Advocate General Ma-
duro, Kadi v. Council, Case C-402/05 P, 1 14-15 (ECJ, Jan. 18, 2008) (not yet re-
ported). In the first case to argue that this extends the scope of Article 308 of the EC
Treaty to include certain objectives of the Union CFSP in its ambit; in the second case
in order to give a broader scope to Article 301 itself.
44. The International Labor Organization is a tripartite UN agency that brings
together governments, employers, and workers of its member states in an effort to pro-
mote decent work conditions throughout the world.
45. See Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061.
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diverging analysis to two different aspects of the ILO Convention
in light of the existing Community legislation in the field cov-
ered by the ILO Convention. The end result is a severe restric-
tion of the ERTA doctrine. On the one hand, when the relevant
Community legislation falls in the domain of the internal market
and is of a normal harmonization character, the ECJ is prepared
to take the following broad view: it is an area which is already
covered to a large extent by Community rules progressively
adopted over a long period of time with a view to harmonizing
rules for the protection of human health and the environment.
Hence, even if there was no complete identity in the matters cov-
ered by the ILO Convention and the relevant Community rules,
that particular part of the ILO Convention could not be con-
cluded by the Member States on their own, since Community law
would be affected and, under the ERTA doctrine, Community
competence was therefore exclusive.46 On the other hand, in
respect of the pure social policy provisions in Community law
and in the ILO Convention, these were on both sides largely
based on minimum norms. The consequence was that logically,
if it turned out that the Community and/or national law was fall-
ing below the ILO minimum standard, Member States could
make up for the difference, since they had the freedom to do so
under Community law. Hence, Community law would not be
affected, if Member States concluded an ILO convention of this
nature on their own and the ERTA doctrine did not apply.4"
The result of this reasoning was not only that ILO conven-
tions, but also many other international agreements (not only in
the social domain, but also in the environmental sector, where
minimum norms are also widely applied in both Community law
and in international conventions) would not fall under exclusive
Community competence. This meant that in important areas
densely covered by Community law, in particular the environ-
ment, the Community was not guaranteed a place on the inter-
national scene and might not be able even to participate in
mixed agreements. That is unless there was another element in
the Convention that was of exclusive Community competence
(as was the case with ILO Convention No. 170) or the Council
was willing to have resort to potential Community competence-
46. See id. 24-26.
47. See id. 16-18, 21.
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a rarity. This case thus probably also contributed to the climate
where the Commission was often only too happy to opt for the
mixed option in respect of international environmental agree-
ments.
Opinions 2 / 9 2 " and 1/944' heralded a further restrictive
interpretation of both trade policy powers and the ERTA doc-
trine. They put an end to any illusion that might have been har-
bored to the effect that Opinion 1/78 implied that the ECJ
would go for an automatically expanding concept of the com-
mon commercial policy in line with the evolution of the concept
in international relations generally.5" That was not to be. The
common commercial policy and its concomitant exclusive Com-
munity powers would essentially need to be restricted to the fol-
lowing matters for which the Community had a single regime at
a natural external border: goods and direct cross-frontier ser-
vices. For other services and the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") 5 1 there was no
single external border regime, unless it had been laid down
somehow in individual cases in internal Community legislation.
Thus, the ERTA doctrine applied in those areas, and the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") Agreements and the Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") Deci-
sions on National Treatment were to be mixed agreements. 52 It
is not necessary critically to comment on these aspects of the
opinions any further.
What is striking about Opinion 1/94 is that it also restricted
the scope of Opinion 1/76 and of the ERTA doctrine by choos-
ing an "objective" approach, excluding the exercise of political
or economic judgment by the Council. Especially the use of the
48. Competence of the Community or one of its Institutions to Participate in the
Third Revised Decision of the OECD on National Treatment, Opinion 2/92, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-521.
49. Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements Con-
cerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property-Article 228(6) of the EC
Treaty, Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267.
50. See International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R.
2871, 36-60.
51. Administered by the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Specifically, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") con-
tains provisions that govern all aspects of intellectual property law including copyright
rights and trademarks.
52. See Opinion 2/92, [1995] E.C.R. 1-521, §§ IV-V; Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. I-
5267, I 98, 105.
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term "necessary" in Opinion 1/76 gave rise to the idea that the
Council might be the one to determine whether recourse should
be had to exclusive external Community competence, as it
deemed that such recourse was economically or even politically
"necessary for the attainment of one of the objectives of the
Community. ''5 However, the ECJ ruled in Opinion 1/76 that
"necessary" referred to some kind of objectively ascertainable ne-
cessity, comparable to the factual situation in that case-namely
the impossibility to diminish shipping capacity on the Rhine
without concluding an agreement with the Swiss about it.5 4
The ERTA doctrine was similarly cut off from the possibility
of turning its application into an economic or even a political
judgment call. The fact that the absence of an international
agreement at the Community level would probably lead to com-
petitive distortions within the internal market for services or
goods (in the latter case caused by differences in legislation on
intellectual property) was not enough to be considered an affec-
tation or an alteration of the scope of Community legislation
within the meaning of the ERTA case. Probable factual distor-
tions in the internal market were not equivalent to actual legal
affectation of Community law.55
It is to be noted that among the external relations cases
coming before the ECJ, after Maastricht and beginning to be de-
cided during the period leading up to the Treaties of Amster-
dam and Nice (but continuing thereafter), there is an increasing
number of cases that concern the demarcation among different
external policies, especially between trade and environmental
policies. 6 This is a natural outcome of the proliferation of dif-
ferent external policies recognized in the EC Treaty after the
Single Act and Maastricht.
53. See Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Wa-
terway Vessels, Opinion, 1/76, [1977] E.C.R. 741, 4.
54. See Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 86.
55. See id. 1 78-79.
56. See generally Cartagena Protocol-Conclusion-Legal Basis-Articles 133 EC,
174(4) EC and 175(1) EC-Living Modified Organisms-Environmental Protection-
Common Commercial Policy, Opinion 2/00, [2001] E.C.R. 1-9713; Commission v.
Council, Case C-281/01, [2002] E.C.R. 1-12049; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott,
Commission v. Council, Case C-94/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1. All three discuss the Prior
Informed Consent Convention with each having different outcomes.
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D. The Amsterdam and Nice Intergovernmental Conferences ("IGCs")
In the light of these restrictive tendencies in the ECJ's case
law on external relations in the 1990s, it was interesting to see
the main amendments to the EC Treaty during the Amsterdam
and Nice Intergovernmental Conferences ("IGCs") that followed
this period. It has already been mentioned how Amsterdam
spelled another leap forward for the CFSP, in particular with the
introduction of the Secretary General/High Representative and
the modification of the treaty-making power. In respect to Com-
munity external relations, Amsterdam primarily meant further
perfection in the treaty-making provisions. Signature, provi-
sional application, and suspension of international agreements
of the Community are provided for and follow the same proce-
dure as conclusion. 57  A new provision on the position to be
taken on a decision of an Association Council, which would have
legal consequences, is also added.58  This latter provision is fur-
ther adapted during the Nice IGC, where the notion of a deci-
sion of an Association Council is expanded to encompass deci-
sions with legal effects on organs of all international organiza-
tions. 59
57. See EC Treaty, supra note 39, art. 300(2), O.J. C 321 E/37, at 176.
58. See id. art. 300, 1 2, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 176. This amendment was actually
based on a long-standing practice in the Council of Ministers with respect to decisions
of Association Councils. Since the Community Presidency representative was invariably
one of the Presidents of the Association Council, normally the decisions, after negotia-
tion with the Association partner(s) were drawn up by the Council Secretariat that as-
sisted the Council Presidency.
59. One may well wonder whether this change was decided after sufficient thought
had been given to the different modalities of decision-making and negotiation in other
international organizations than associations, especially as the procedure laid down in
the new provision is rather heavy, including a full-fledged proposal by the Commission.
In some international organizations, such as the WTO and fisheries organizations, ne-
gotiations continue until the last minute before a "decision" is taken. This is not ideal
for giving the Commission the time to come forward with a formal proposal, to put it
mildly. In many organizations decisions having legal effect are only reached after opt-
out or opt-in procedures have been applied, so that it is unclear when the Community
should actually take its position. In other organizations there can be total ambiguity
about whether the decision actually does have legal effects. This provision has already
given rise to a ferocious debate in the Council on how to apply it, when certain stages of
the NWTO negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda are passed. Is such a stage in
the negotiations which is officialized in an instrument of the N'ATO Ministerial Confer-
ence or General Council merely a phase in the negotiations that the Council can only
stop by changing the negotiating directives, requiring a qualified majority? Or does it
require a Council decision in which case a mere blocking minority can stop the course
of events?
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The Treaty of Nice also introduced a new power, Article
181a, in the field of technical and financial assistance to coun-
tries other than developing countries so as to avoid in the future
having to have recourse to the flexibility provision of Article 308
of the EC Treaty.6 ° This provision was of importance especially
for relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union that
did not fall in the category of aspiring new Members.61
The provisions introduced into the EC Treaty by the IGCs
of Amsterdam and Nice can be seen on one hand as represent-
ing a tendency among the Member States to ensure that the
Community institutions in their external relations should be sub-
ject to stricter and more detailed rules with respect to both the
substantive and procedural aspects of external relations. On the
other hand, these IGCs also gave signals that the ECJ's restraint
in the field of trade policy might have gone too far. At Amster-
dam, a first opening was made so that services and TRIPS could
after all be covered by Community competence in the field of
trade, but a unanimous decision in the Council would be
needed for that.62 In Nice, the IGC went further down this road,
including services and TRIPS in the common commercial policy
in principle, but surrounding this with many caveats, in particu-
lar relating to certain services sectors which were considered par-
ticularly sensitive-such as health, educational and audiovisual
services-and by creating a new kind of trade agreement, the so-
called horizontal agreement-such as trade agreements of the
WTO, that relate horizontally to all services and TRIPS sectors,
including the sensitive sectors. 63  However, the relevant
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 133 on trade policy are so badly
and vaguely drafted that it is very difficult to say whether such
horizontal agreements remain within the exclusive Community
competence in trade policy and "merely" require unanimity or
still fall into mixed competence, as before Nice.64
60. See Treaty of Nice, supra note 20, art. 2(16), O.J. C 80/1, at 21. Article 2(16) is
the current Article 181a of the EC Treaty.
61. See EC Treaty, supra note 39, art. 181a, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 127.
62. See id., supra note 39, art. 133, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 105.
63. See Treaty of Nice, supra note 20, art. 2(8), O.J. C 80/1, at 15. Article 2(8) of
the Treaty of Nice is current Article 133 of the EC Treaty.
64. See Commission v. Council, Case C-13/07 (pending case).
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E. The ECJ vacillates on its ERTA doctrine
After these mixed signals in the field of external relations
from Amsterdam and Nice, the ECJ seems also rather uncertain
of the line it should follow in this domain, especially with respect
to the ERTA doctrine. In the so-called "Open Skies" aviation
agreements with the United States, the ECJ was quite restrictive
in its application of its own ERTA case law.65 However, four
years later in Opinion 1/03, concerning the exclusive compe-
tence of the EC to adhere to the Lugano Convention (an agree-
ment with a number of neighboring States), which extended the
operation of Regulation 44/2001 on the recognition of judg-
ments and jurisdiction in private international law, the ECJ was
ready to show a somewhat broader approach to its own case
law.6
6
The Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain [hereinaf-
ter Open Skies] case is so detailed, almost "pontillistic" in its rea-
soning that it would be beyond the scope of this essay to analyze
it in detail. The fact that these were all infringement cases and
that it was, therefore, necessary for the Commission to prove in
detail at which points the respective Member States had
breached the Treaty (in particular as interpreted by the ECJ in
its ERTA case) probably contributed to this approach. Let it suf-
fice here to say that the Commission, for instance, tried to argue
that, even though the two main regulations on the Community
aviation market were restricted to Community carriers, the
granting of such fifth freedom rights through individual Mem-
ber States' aviation agreements to third States' air carriers
caused the latter to compete on a market regulated by Commu-
nity legislation and thus affecting this Community regulation di-
rectly. However, the ECJ rejected this once more as a pure eco-
nomic consequence of Community regulation and not an objec-
tive legal affectation within the meaning of its ERTA case.67
On the whole, the ECJ's approach to ERTA, in the wake of
Advocate-General Tizzano, was an extremely meticulous and
65. See Commission v. United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Denmark, Sweden,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, and Germany, Joined Cases 466, 469, 471, 472, 475,
476/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9427, 1 123-45.
66. See Competency of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Opinion 1/03, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
67. See Commission v. Belgium, Case 471/98, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9681, 101-04.
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painstaking finding against the Commission's complaints on
some points and in favor of them on others. In the end, there-
fore, the Member States were condemned and such Open Skies
agreements henceforth had to be concluded as mixed agree-
ments. The very detailed application of the ERTA doctrine
made many in the Commission and Council despair about their
ability to achieve agreements between the institutions on the di-
viding line between exclusive Community competence and
mixed agreements without going to the ECJ every time. How-
ever, in this particular context of Community aviation policy, it
turned out that another aspect of the case was much more im-
portant than the further application and development of the
ERTA doctrine-namely the ECJ's declaration that the reserva-
tion of the rights under these agreements to the air carrier(s) of
the Member State concerned was contrary to the freedom to
provide services." Since this was the main reason why Member
States wanted to conclude these agreements on their own, the
particular points which according to the ERTA analysis the
Member States had retained their external powers (notwith-
standing considerable internal Community legislation) counted
for much less. Thus a new Open Skies agreement with the
United States ("U.S.") was in the end concluded as a pure Com-
munity agreement.69 Below we will return to another aspect of
Community treaty-making in the aviation sector.
Opinion 1/03 on the Lugano Convention was in many ways
a result of the Open Skies case. Emboldened by the very de-
tailed approach followed by the ECJ in those cases, the Member
States in the Council felt encouraged to question the exclusive
competence of the Community, even in respect of an interna-
tional agreement that was near identical to a Community regula-
tion. It was also to be a first judicial test of the application of the
ERTA doctrine in the field ofjustice and home affairs which had
been transferred from the third pillar to the Community with
the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Opinion 1/03 stands out because it ventures to give a full
restatement of the ERTA doctrine before actually applying it to
the Lugano Convention. v° In passing, the ECJ also further re-
68. See id. 1 131-32.
69. See Commission Decision No. 2007/339/EC, O.J. L 134/1, at 1 (2007).
70. See Opinion 1/03, 43-95 (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
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stricts the possibility of direct obligatory recourse to external
powers under the doctrine of Opinion 1/76.71 Thus, after hav-
ing briefly recalled that in principle the (potential) external
powers of the Community extend all the way across the spectrum
covered by the EC Treaty, the ECJ reduces the concept of "objec-
tive necessity" to exercise external competences for the realiza-
tion of internal objectives of the Community, to simultaneity of
the exercise of external and internal competence.72 The notion
of simultaneity has been criticized by the author elsewhere.73
Moreover, one wonders what remains the distinguishing feature
of the approach of Opinion 1/76 compared to the ERTA doc-
trine. The corresponding external power will simply be exer-
cised at the same time or hard on the heels of the internal legis-
lation and would no longer be an obligatory first recourse to a
potential external power. Thus the approach of Opinion 1/76 is
simply absorbed by the ERTA doctrine.
First of all, the ECJ cites point 17 of the ERTAjudgment in
order to recall a core idea, namely that every time common rules
have been adopted, Member States no longer had the right, in-
dividually or collectively, to undertake obligations with third
States which affect those rules.7 1 In other words: in such situa-
tions the Community has exclusive external competence. 75 Sec-
ondly, the ECJ then turns to Opinion 2/91 in order to recall that
the Community rules which cover a specific area-especially in
the case of progressive harmonization on the road to the inter-
nal market under simultaneous upholding of such values as the
environment and human health-could be considered affected
71. Id. 114-15.
72. Id. 91115.
73. P.J. Kuijper, The Opinion on the Lugano Convention and the Implied External Rela-
tions Powers of the European Community, in JUSTICE, LIBERTY, SECURITY: NEW CHALLENGES
FOR THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (B. Martenczuk & S. van Thiel
eds.) (forthcoming 2008).
74. See Competency of the Community to Conclude the New Lugano Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Opinion 1/03, 1 44, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
75. The ECJ also recalls in passing that this applies also in areas falling outside
common policies and that this is underpinned by the principle of Article 10 of the EC
Treaty. See Opinion 1/03, 11 115-18, quoting from ERTA, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R.
263, 1 17, and Convention Number 170 of the International Labour Organization Con-
cerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061,
It 10-11.
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by international obligations in that area.7 6
The ECJ, however, continues to accept the minimum stan-
dards exception; but, only in cases where both the Community
law and the international convention contain minimum stan-
dards, 77 as well as the economic affectation exception. In this
connection the ECJ places great emphasis on the need for a spe-
cific analysis of both the agreement envisaged and the relevant
Community law in force possibly affected thereby. 78 What is im-
portant is to ensure a uniform and consistent application of
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system they
establish. This may not be touched by international obligations
accepted by the Member States. The purpose of the exclusive
external competence of the Community is primarily to maintain
the integrity of Community law and the effectiveness of the Com-
munity system, according to the ECJ.79
This is clearly a minimalist approach by the ECJ and con-
firms that the continued existence of the external sovereignty of
the Member States is of prime importance, as opposed to the full
parallelism between internal and external powers of the Com-
munity. The exception for minimum standards remains a clear
sign in this connection.
It is not useful here to summarize at any length the way in
which the ECJ applies this restatement of the ERTA doctrine,
but the impression one retains from reading this part of the
opinion is that it brings some improvement in the application of
that doctrine. In particular, the ECJ here seems to be ready to
make a less formalistic analysis of the probable situation that
would result from the Member States concluding the projected
agreement on their own than it did in the Open Skies cases.8"
76. See Opinion 1/03, 120, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported), referring to
the opinion on the Convention Number 170 of the International Labour Organization
Concerning Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. I-
1061, 1 25-26.
77. In the author's view only the presence of minimum standards on the Commu-
nity side is legally relevant, even in the approach of the ECJ.
78. See Opinion 1/03, 124, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
79. See Opinion 1/03, J 128, 131, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
80. This is particularly clear from the way in which the ECJ treats a favorite Mem-
ber State argument for the proposition that even Regulation 44/2001 left a certain
amount of power to the Member States, namely that Article 4(1) contained a reference
to the Law of Member States. See Competency of the Community to Conclude the New
Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Opinion 1/03, It 148-50, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006)
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On the other hand the same realistic approach has not yet
taken hold with respect to the problem of Community legisla-
tion containing minimum rules. On that point, it remains
rather odd that the ECJ almost seems to encourage a total or
partial absence of the Community at the international level in
areas where Community legislation may be very broad and im-
portant, simply because it is based on minimum rules.
81
F. By way of Interim Conclusion
The preceding paragraphs of this section have ventured to
sketch a dialogue, or at the very least a pattern of action/reac-
tion, between the case law of the ECJ in respect of foreign rela-
tions powers generally, and trade policy powers in particular, on
the one hand and the results of the IGCs beginning with the one
on the Single Act. It is clear that after the early case law of the
ECJ of the 1970s, which opened up an enormous potential ex-
pansion of the Community's powers in external relations, the
Member States acted to bring matters back under control. On
the one hand, this was done through the progressive develop-
ment of the intergovernmental EPC and later the CFSP-of
which the latter explicitly shared the institutional framework
with the Community. On the other hand, the Single Act and
then the Maastricht Treaty laid down more explicit external rela-
tions powers (in such fields as science and technology, environ-
ment and development), which were declared "shared" in the
Treaty provisions themselves. The fact alone that these explicit
external relations powers were enacted and were declared to be
shared served to circumscribe and limit the scope for expansion
of the common commercial policy, which had been declared ex-
clusive by the ECJ. Determining in the Treaty itself that external
powers were mixed, even though it was not the intention to kill
off the ERTA doctrine as such, contributed to the inexorable
rise of mixity in external relations-a phenomenon that also
permitted the Member States to reassert their control over Com-
munity external relations.
Perhaps not in direct reaction to these developments at the
"constitutional" level (though one should never forget that the
(not yet reported). But see Commission v. Belgium, Case 471/98, [2002] E.C.R. 9681, 1
103.
81. See Opinion 1/03, 11 123-27, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
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ECJ was deliberating on Opinion 1/94 during the period of rati-
fication of the Maastricht Treaty, at a time when several ratifica-
tions threatened to go sour), the ECJ became considerably more
circumspect in the first half of the 1990s, when it rejected an
expansive interpretation of the common commercial policy and
also became more restrictive in its interpretations of Opinion 1/
76 and of the ERTA case in the domain of general external rela-
tions powers.
After this, the IGCs of Amsterdam and Nice not only bring a
further important development of the EU/CFSP side of external
relations (Treaty of Amsterdam), but also further provisions on
explicit treaty-making powers and further detailed procedural
rules. On the other hand, as we have seen, the Member States in
the IGC were ready to reconsider their own preference and that
of the ECJ for a narrowly defined commercial policy. The out-
come, however, is sometimes rather internally contradictory, as
exemplified by the largely vain attempts of the IGC of Nice to
extend and clarify the scope of the commercial policy powers of
the Community.
It is within that context that one can place the ECJ's hesita-
tion over the interpretation, or rather the application, of its own
ERTA decision in two successive big cases: Open Skies and
Lugano. On the whole, the ERTA doctrine remains a difficult
instrument to apply so that one can say with sufficient certainty
that the choice the institutions make for exclusivity or mixity will
be upheld by the ECJ.
III. THE PRECEDING HISTORICAL ANALYSIS VIEWED FROM
ANOTHER ANGLE
It is also possible to analyze the facts and analysis set out
above from a different angle. The continuous expansion of ex-
ternal relations activities of the EC/EU, either through the ap-
plication of the ECJ's various implied powers or by the addition
of new explicit external relations powers in the EC Treaty, can
also be interpreted as a natural response to the worldwide trend
to want to regulate matters with a global impact (trade, world
finance, environmental problems, health problems, etc.) at a
supra-regional level. As a kind of compensation for this expan-
sion in scope of EC/EU external relations, Member States de-
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mand an ever-stronger grip on EC/EU external relations. They
realize this stronger influence in three ways.
First, this is done through intergovernmental mechanisms.
In this respect, one can mention the "bridge" between the "polit-
ical" sanctions decision in the framework of CFSP and the
"trade" decision within the community (Articles 301 and 60 of
the EC Treaty). However, in a much more indirect way the coor-
dination requirement of Article 3 of the TEU can also be used in
order to make the Community march in lockstep with the
Union's CFSP. Earlier, we signaled the specific formula that had
been developed to this effect in the Council.
Secondly, it is well documented in a long line of literature-
and we have briefly referred to it above-that mixity is also an
effective instrument to ensure that Member States are not con-
fronted with measures in the external relations field that they
could not stomach. Since mixity de facto brings about, if not
formal unanimity, at least a kind of veto in relation to interna-
tional agreements, it can be an effective negative instrument for
the Member States in Community external relations. The big
practical problem that mixed agreements now encounter is obvi-
ously the growth in Member States' numbers and the concomi-
tantly growing need to get national ratifications done within a
decent period of time. Already with fifteen Member States, the
entry into force of mixed agreements is routinely delayed by
three to four years. The provisional application of the part of
the agreement that falls under Community competence can
have great disadvantages inherent in the instrument of provi-
sional application, such as the possibility of instantaneous termi-
nation of the provisionally applied agreement.82
The third way in which Member States, as constitutional leg-
islators, have tried to improve their hold on Community external
relations is by stronger control inside the Community domain.
The increased differentiation and precision of the procedural
rules on treaty-making, laid down in current Article 300 of the
EC Treaty, is a good example.8" The discussions on Article 133
of the EC Treaty (commercial policy) are a great illustration of
82. An agreement that is provisionally applied can be terminated at any time with-
out providing reasons. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 25(2), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
83. See EC Treaty, supra note 39, art. 300, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 176-77.
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the following contradictory tendencies described here: expan-
sion of the scope of trade policy into the areas of trade in ser-
vices and TRIPS and attempts (successful or not)"4 to guarantee
that Member States will at the very least need to muster unanim-
ity in order to approve the most important, so-called "horizon-
tal," agreements in this sector, or even guarantee mixed compe-
tence.
However, by successfully pushing for these guarantees as a
condition for granting a wider and wider scope for EC/EU ex-
ternal relations, the Member States as a constitutional assembly
have created a number of problems for the Community/Union.
First of all the separation between Community and Union has
now arrived at the point where de facto they have become two
separate international personalities. This means that Commu-
nity/Union negotiators have to explain to their third State coun-
terparts that for different subject matters they need to conclude
an agreement with either the Community or the Union and that
to do so with both at the same time may well be very difficult, if
not impossible because of the "Chinese wall" of Article 47
TEU. s5
Secondly, as a consequence of Member States' insistence on
mixity, it may have to be explained to third country negotiators
that even if they decide to go ahead with the Community alone,
there may be areas which do not fall under (exclusive) compe-
tence of the Community, necessitating the presence of twenty-
seven Member States or co-contracting parties to the future
agreement, resulting in a very long ratification period and com-
plications relating to provisional application. Finally, as an ex-
tra, "small" complication, there is geographical variability as a
consequence of the existing opt-outs and opt-ins for the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. This involves an explication to
negotiating partners that the agreement on issues relating to asy-
lum, immigration, illegal aliens and readmission, shall not apply
to Denmark in any case, and probably will not, but still might,
apply to the United Kingdom and Ireland, depending whether
they will opt-in the agreement or not (which they can only do,
84. This will depend on the outcome of Commission of the European Communi-
ties v. Council of the European Union, Case C 13/07 (pending case).
85. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, art. 47, OJ. C 321 E/l, at 34 (2006).
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following ERTA's logic backwards, if they have opted into the
underlying internal legislation in the past).
Finally, the EC/EU is increasingly confronted with a lack of
understanding about its structure and functioning, especially on
the Community side. Because of the increased intensity of inter-
national (commercial) relations, States become more and more
interested in the implementation that treaty partners give of
their international obligations. Because of the specific structure
of the Community, which in terms of comparative federalism
studies, practices a kind of "executive federalism," (i.e., Commu-
nity law is not implemented, applied and enforced by a separate
layer of "federal" administration, police and judiciary present in
all Member States, but is directly applicable in all Member States
and thus applied and enforced by the relevant national authori-
ties), third States run into national authorities when there are
problems with the application and enforcement of international
agreements concluded by the Community alone. This has given
rise to such (possible) misunderstandings as the United States
attacking the United Kingdom and Ireland in the WTO about
difficulties concerning the treatment of computer equipment86
and Russia cornering Poland and other neighbors over sanitary
issues in the trade of bovine meat in late 2006.87 Here is an in-
teresting problem of international responsibility that will not be
discussed in any depth here," but that has contributed to reflec-
tion inside the Community on how to exercise its external rela-
tions powers, in particular its treaty-making powers, and possibly
re-delegate some of these powers back to the Member States
within clear parameters set in Community legislation, or even
86. See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classifi-
cation of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/R (June 5, 1998); Appellate Body
Report, United Kingdom-Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,
WT/DS67/R (June 5, 1998); Appellate Body Report, Ireland-Customs Classification of
Certain Computer Equipment, VAIT/DS68/R (June 5, 1998). In the end the panel and
the Appellate Body accepted that the European Community was the responsible IWTO
Member in this case, but the impression is that this decision by the panel rested per-
haps more on the unilateral assumption of responsibility by the Commission on behalf
of the Community.
87. See Commission Press Release, MEX/06/1220, (Dec. 20, 2006); Press Release
issued at the "Midday Express" conference of the Commission on December 20, 2006,
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEX/06/1220.
88. See Esa Paasivirta & PieterJan Kuijper, Does One Size fit All? The European Commu-
nity and the Responsibility of International Organizations, 36 NETH. YEARBOOK INT'L L. 169,
169-226 (2005).
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leave some of these powers entirely to the Member States since
they are really questions of execution.
Obviously the first reflex of the Community will be to re-
claim its rights as the international treaty partner in question,
but as the Community discovered in respect to aviation agree-
ments and readmission questions, there are a number of big is-
sues and/or big partners that the Community should be inter-
ested in itself. Thus on aviation, as was mentioned earlier, the
big aviation agreement was concluded between the EC and the
U.S.,89 while aviation agreements with smaller partners, in which
only a few Member State carriers would be interested, could be
left to these Member States, constrained by some rules of princi-
ple of Community law laid down in a regulation.9 ° Similarly, in
respect to readmission agreements, the basic conditions of read-
mission of illegal aliens, that are nationals of or residents of the
partner country, are laid down in the Community readmission
agreement with the country concerned, 91 whereas the necessary
details concerning the actual readmission operations can be bet-
ter agreed between the Member State that will be actually send-
ing back illegal aliens and the readmitting country. Thus the
Community sees what has sometimes been called its multi-level
governance reflected in a multi-level conclusion of international
agreements.
IV. TRENDS CONFIRMED BY THE REFORM TREATY?
The intertwining between the CFSP-which will remain
firmly intergovernmental-and the rest of the EU (i.e., the ex-
Community portion of it) will become more pronounced, now
that the Reform Treaty institutes a single Union with one legal
89. See Air Transport Agreement, United States-European Community, Apr. 30,
2007, 46 ILM 470, OJ. L 134/4 (2007).
90. See Council Regulation No. 847/2004, O.J. L 157/7, at 8 (discussing negotia-
tion and implementation of air services agreements and third countries).
91. See Agreement Between the European Community and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia on the Readmission of Persons Residing Without Authorization,
O.J. L 334/7 (2007); Agreement between the European Community and the Republic
of Moldova on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization, O.J. L 334/
149 (2007) [hereinafter Moldova Agreement]. Readmission agreements are all drafted
along the same lines and contain an article on implementing protocols to be concluded
between the partner State and a Member State. See Moldova Agreement, art. 19, OJ. L
334/149, at 155 (2007).
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personality on the international scene.92 Nevertheless, there will
remain two treaties within the one Union, which will be of equal
value93 and of which the different decision-making methods will
be mutually protected from each other. 4
Given the single international personality of the Union, it
will conclude agreements with third states which might go across
the whole spectrum of powers of the Union under the TEU and
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU").5 How this can be possibly squared with the continu-
ing existence of an even stronger "Chinese wall" between CFSP
and the rest of the Union remains somewhat of a mystery.
Another indication that the trend of the Fouchet Plan to
superimpose political cooperation on the Community is still
alive is provided by the provisions on the High Representative
for the CFSP who shall be President of the Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil and at the same time Vice President of the European Com-
mission. 6 Thus the representative par excellence of the in-
tergovernmentalism of the CFSP shall have a seat in the last re-
maining bulwark of the "mthode communautaire," where he/
she is supposed to get a coordinating grip on his/her Commis-
sion colleagues who lead the other (previously Community) sub-
jects of external relations. In order to make this dominance of
the political cooperation side over the formerly Community side
of external relations even clearer, the President of the European
Council has an independent foreign affairs power in the CSFP
domain.97 What will come of the Commission's ensuring the
Union's external representation, now formally recognized for
the first time,9 in these circumstances is a big question.
The propagation of mixity as a means for the Member
92. See TEU, supra note 15, arts. 1, 47, O.J. C 321 E/1, at 10, 34.
93. See id., supra note 15, art. 1, O.J. C 321 E/l, at 10.
94. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art. 25b, O.J. C 306/01, at 32; TEU, supra note
85, art. 47, O.J. C 321 E/1, at 34 (2006). Article 25b (becoming Article 40 of the TFEU,
if ratified) unlike Article 47 of the TEU, does not only protect the Community against
the CFSP, but also the CFSP against the Community.
95. If ratified, the amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon to the TEU and the EC
Treaty will be consolidated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
96. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art. 9e, O.J. C 305/01, at 21 (becoming Article
18 of the TFEU, if ratified).
97. See id., supra note 7, art. 9b, O.J. C 305/01, at 17 (becoming Article 15(6) (d) of
the TFEU, if ratified).
98. See id., supra note 7, art. 9d, O.J. C 305/0), at 19 (becoming Article 17(1) of
the TFEU, if ratified).
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States to maintain at least a veto over external relations remains
firmly rooted in the Reform Treaty, as is the increasing trend of
giving Member States the possibility of continuing to conclude
treaties of their own, even in areas where the ERTA doctrine
would still continue to work.99 A good (or rather, bad) example
is Declaration 36 to the Reform Treaty, which gives Member
States this possibility in the area of freedom, security and justice.
However, that sector can in no way be compared to development
cooperation where Community and Member State technical and
financial assistance can easily co-exist, as long as they are well-
coordinated. The ERTA doctrine will normally apply in free-
dom, security and justice and hence there will be sectors that are
largely covered by substantial Community legislation and thus
presumably fall under exclusive Community competence. In
those circumstances Member State agreements next to Commu-
nity agreements or legislation will simply continue to be ille-
gal. 100
In the same way the tendency to strictly regulate the Com-
munity/Union powers in external relations and the conditions
of their application continues unabated in the Reform Treaty.
There are now clear objectives laid down in the external rela-
tions field, both at the general level with Article 3 and Article 5
of the TEU, and more specifically in Article 21 of the TEU. The
latter Article, directly taken over from the Treaty on the Euro-
pean Constitution, is remarkable because, though placed in the
Treaty on European Union, it also contains objectives which
would normally belong in the "Community" part of external re-
lations (now in the, yet to be ratified, Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union), such as objectives in the field of devel-
opment, abolition of the obstacles in the field of international
trade and sustainable use of the earth's natural resources.10'
This is a clear demonstration that the initial goal of a single
treaty on the European Constitution still leaves its traces that the
99. The Maastricht Treaty stated that in the areas of monetary policy, environment
and development, Member States retain their competence to negotiate and to conclude
agreements, despite the treaty-imposed shared powers and provisions such as those in
Article 174(4) and Article 181 of the EC Treaty, second alinea. So far the ECJ has not
yet had to rule on the relationship between those provisions and the declaration.
100. See Opinion 1/03, 124, (ECJ Feb. 7, 2006) (not yet reported).
101. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art. 188a-f, O.J. C 305/01, at 91 (becoming
Articles 205-07 TFEU, if ratified).
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real integration of ex-Community external relations into the
CFSP is still the final objective, in spite of the equal value of the
two Treaties and the reinforced "Chinese wall" provision of Arti-
cle 40 of the Reform Treaty.
On the other hand, this being the case, the IGC was ready
to continue its reform of the common commercial policy by tak-
ing two clear steps forward. First, foreign direct investment is
now fully included among the powers of the Community in this
domain. This step was somewhat overdue, since after Nice, for-
eign direct investment in services was covered de facto by Article
133, thus leaving a gap with respect to foreign direct investment
in manufacturing. Secondly, the notion of mixity has been ban-
ished from the common commercial policy and unanimity re-
stricted to a few clearly drafted exceptions. In respect to trade in
services and foreign direct investment, unanimity is required
when it is also necessary for the adoption of internal rules. In
respect to the well-known sensitive services sectors (cultural and
audiovisual services, social, education and health services), una-
nimity is required when agreements risk prejudicing the Union's
cultural and linguistic diversity, or where agreements risk seri-
ously disturbing social, education or health services in the Mem-
ber States and prejudicing the responsibility of the Member
States to deliver them."°2 It is also with a view to most of these
special sectors that trade agreements cannot lead to harmoniza-
tion where the treaties exclude such harmonization.1 1 3 It must
be admitted that these exceptions in favor of unanimity seem to
be miracles of clarity compared to the Nice version of the Com-
munity's trade policy powers.
The trend to lay down more and more detailed rules on the
procedures for concluding treaties and in this way discipline the
Community institutions also continues unabated. The Article on
the negotiation, signature, and conclusion of international
agreements now contains eleven paragraphs, some of them with
many sub-paragraphs. This is in part the result of the increased
democratization of external relations, including commercial pol-
102. See id., supra note 7, art. 188c(4), O.J. C 305/01, at 92 (becoming Article
207(4) TFEU, if ratified).
103. See id., supra note 7, art. 188c(3), O.J. C 305/01, at 92 (becoming Article
207(4) TFEU, if ratified).
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icy,1 °4 and in part the consequence of the more elaborate rules
on who will have the right to make recommendations for the
negotiation of an agreement and who will be chief negotiator for
the Union during the negotiations. This right will depend on
where the emphasis lies in the proposed agreement. If it is in
the field of the CFSP, it will be the High Representative; if it is in
the field of the other policies of the Union, it will presumably be
the Commission.10 5 There is quite some room for interpretation
in this provision and it is more than likely that it will give rise to
some disputes before some kind of balance is found-which
given the dynamics of the last years may well be more favorable
to the intergovernmental side.
Finally the trend to lay down more and more precise rules
tying down the Community/Union in external relations is also
apparent in a rather clumsy attempt to codify the treaty-making
power of the Union, based on the case law of the ECJ described
earlier in this essay. It is useful to quote Article 216(1) TFEU
here:
The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more
third countries or international organizations where the
Treaty so provides or where the conclusion of an agreement
is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the
Union's policies, one of the objectives referred to in the trea-
ties,"' or is provided for in a legally binding act of the Union
or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.' 0 7
The oddity of this provision is that, except for the words "where
the Treaty provides," it takes elements from the case law of the
ECJ on the exclusive external Community competence to define
the potential treaty-making power of the Union. This is basically
contrary to the case-law of the ECJ which, as we saw at the begin-
ning of this essay, has determined that the Community disposes
of potential treaty-making power across the whole spectrum cov-
104. See id., supra note 7, art. 188N, O.J. C 305/01, at 97 (becoming Article
218b(a) TFEU, if ratified).
105. See id. (becoming Article 218(3) TFEU, if ratified).
106. See id., supra note 7, art. 188L(l), O.J. C 305/01, at 96 (becoming art. 216(a)
TFEU, if ratified). This part of the provisions seems to originate in the opinion on the
Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels,
Opinion 1/76, [1977] EC.R. 741.
107. See Reform Treaty, supra note 7, art. 188L(1), O.J. C 305/01, at 96. This part
of the provisions seems to originate in B4guelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export.,
Case 22/71, [1971] E.C.R. 949.
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ered by the Community treaty and not only "where the Treaty so
provides," or to passages adapted from Opinion 1/76 and ERTA.
It is another example of how the interpretative dynamism of the
ECJ in external relations is or will be stifled by codification in the
Reform Treaty.
It must be hoped that this strange provision is at least par-
tially corrected insofar as the exclusive Union competence is
concerned, by Article 3 of the TFEU, the provision listing the
exclusive powers of the Union (customs union, competition,
monetary policy of the euro, conservation of marine biological
resources and the common commercial policy are mentioned in
paragraph 1) which contains the following second paragraph:
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the con-
clusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or inso-
far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their
scope.
Again this is a rather awkward mixture of language from the
ERTA case and Opinion 1/76,'08 this time to define the exclu-
sive treaty-making competence.
Reverting to the theme of the dialogue between the ECJ
and the constitutional legislator, it is more than likely that the
two provisions of Articles 216(2) and 3(2) TFEU will again stim-
ulate this dialogue. Is the ECJ going to adhere to the awkward
and selective quotations from its old case law of thirty years ago
and become a strict constructionist on this basis or will it regard
these quotations as a justification of its case law and continue to
develop it, as before? It is to be hoped that the ECJ will opt for
the latter approach.
108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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